Policy advice with imperfectly informed experts

Advances in Theoretical Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Battaglini, Marco ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric Information; Cheap talk; Experts

Indexed keywords

EID: 14844363467     PISSN: 15345963     EISSN: 15345963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1100     Document Type: Article

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