Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 1379-1401

  Battaglini, Marco ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Experts; Information transmission

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; FINANCE; PUBLIC POLICY;

POLICY DECISIONS;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 0036074849     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00336     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Information transmission in debate
2. Information acquisition and orthogonal argument
3. Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
4. Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation
5. Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk
6. Coalition-proof nash equilibria I: Concepts
7. Strategic information transmission
8. Sense and sensibility: The role of rules
9. Cheap talk with two audiences
10. Collective decision-making and standing committees: An informational rational for restrictive amendments procedures
11. Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee
12. A model of expertise
13. Comparing committee and floor preferences
14. Veto threats: Rhetoric in a bargaining game
15. Political correctness
16. A theory of credibility
17. Cheap talk and the fed: A theory of imprecise policy announcements
18. Collusion and the theory of organization