Eliciting information from multiple experts

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 141-160

  Wolinsky, Asher ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication; Information transmission; Multiple experts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036811808     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00003-9     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Austen-Smith, D., 1993. Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule. Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1), 3-43.
2. Austen-Smith, D., Banks, J., 1996. Information aggregation, rationality and the condorcet jury theorem. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 90 (1), 34-45.
3. Barany, I., 1992. Fair distribution protocols or how the players replace fortune. Math. Oper. Res. 17, 327-340.
4. Battaglini, M., 1999. Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk. Econometrica, forthcoming.
5. Ben-Porath, E., 1998. Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by "cheap" pre-play procedures. J. Econ. Theory 80, 108-122.
6. Bester, H., Strausz, R., 2001. Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The single agent case. Econometrica 69, 1077-1098.
7. Crawford, V., Sobel, J., 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50 (6), 1431-1451.
8. Dessein, W., 1999. Authority and communications in organizations. GREMAQ Working paper.
9. Feddersen, T., Pesendorfer, W., 1998. Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdict. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 92, 23-35.
10. Forges, F., 1990. Universal mechanisms. Econometrica 58, 1341-1364.
11. Gerardi, D., 2001. Strategic Decision Making and Information Transmission. Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University.
12. Gilligan, T., Krehbiel, K., 1989. Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a beterogenous committee. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 33 (2).
13. Krishna, V., Morgan, J., 2001. A model of expertise. Quart. J. Econ. 116, 747-775.