A signaling model of repeated elections

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 251-261

  Shotts, Kenneth W ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748555922     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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