Voting as communicating

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 169-191

  Piketty, Thomas ^a  

^a CEPREMAP   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; MODELING; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0034532225     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00126     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. 'Sophisticated voting' in the 1988 presidential primaries
2. Information aggregation, rationality and the condorcet jury theorem
3. The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: The electoral college and shift voting
4. Why vote for losers?
5. Asymmetric information and the electoral momentum of public opinion polls
6. Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information
7. Abstention and common values
8. The two faces of tactical voting
9. On the origins of limited government
10. Tactical voting: Concepts, measurement and findings
11. Tactical voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An alternative approach
12. The political consequences of electoral laws, 1945-1985
13. Do we really want more public spending?
14. Information aggregation through costly political action
15. Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement date as information sources
16. Population uncertainty and poisson games
17. Extended poisson games and the condorcet jury theorem
18. A theory of voting equilibria
19. Information aggregation through voting and vote-trading
20. Voting as communicating
21. Rational debate leads to one-dimensional conflict
22. The information aggregation approach to political institutions
23. Attachment to the welfare state
24. Britain: Labour and electoral reform
25. Condorcet's theory of voting