A model of expertise

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 116, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 747-775

  Krishna, Vijay ^a   Morgan, John ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006739059     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/00335530151144159     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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