Signaling and election motivations in a voting model with common values and responsive candidates

Econometrica

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 1083-1119

  Razin, Ronny ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Information aggregation; Responsive candidates; Signaling; Strategic voting; The effect of vote shares on policy

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; NUMERICAL METHODS; OPTIMIZATION; PUBLIC POLICY; VOTING MACHINES;

ELECTIONS; INFORMATION AGGREGATION; RESPONSIVE CANDIDATES; STRATEGIC VOTING;

MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

EID: 0141718523     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00440     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Austen-Smith, D., and J. Banks (1996): "Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, 90, 34-45.
2. Berend, D., and J. Paroush (1998): "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem Valid?" Social Choice and Welfare, 15, 481-488.
3. Castanheira, M. (2002): "Why Vote for Losers?" CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3404, Center for Economic Policy Research, London.
4. Condorcet, A. (1785): Essai sur l'Application de l'Annalyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite des Voix. Paris, France: Imprimerie Royale.
5. Feddersen, T., and W. Pesendorfer (1997): "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, 65, 1029-1058.
6. Feller, W. (1971): An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Volume 2, 2nd ed. New York, London: John Wiley & Sons.
7. Lohman, S. (1993): "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action," American Political Science Review, 87, 319-333.
8. Myerson, R. B. (2000): "Large Poison Games," Journal of Economic Theory, 94, 7-45.
9. Piketty, T. (1999): "The Information-Aggregation Approach to Political Institutions," European Economic Review, 43, 791-800.
10. ____ (2000): "Voting as Communicating," The Review of Economic Studies, 67, 169-192.
11. Razin, R. (2001): "Swing Voters and Mandate Makers: Information Aggreation and The Effect of Vote Shares on Policy," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, Ch. 3.
12. Shotts, K. W. (2000): "A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections," Unpublished Manuscript, Northwestern University.
13. Spector, D. (1995): "In Defense of Indirect Democracy," Ph.D. Dissertation, DELTA, Paris, Ch. 4.