Recent developments in German corporate governance

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 175-193

  Goergen, Marc ^a,d   Manjon, Miguel C ^b   Renneboog, Luc ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI   (Spain)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^d European Corporate Governance Institute   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Board of directors; Co determination; Corporate governance; Mergers and acquisitions; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 49749109088     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2008.06.003     Document Type: Article

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