Corporate governance convergence: Evidence from takeover regulation reforms in Europe

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 243-268

  Goergen, Marc ^a   Martynova, Marina ^b   Luc, Renneboog ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORPORATE STRATEGY; INDUSTRIAL REGULATION;

EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; WORLD;

EID: 23844455194     PISSN: 0266903X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/gri015     Document Type: Article

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