Bank-firm relationships, financing and firm performance in Germany

Economics Letters

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 225-232

  Agarwal, Rajshree ^a   Ann Elston, Julie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Bank firm relationships; G00; G3; Germany; L00

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035646769     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00427-X     Document Type: Article

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