Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 17-27

  Kraft, Kornelius ^a   Niederprüm, Antonia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DUISBURG ESSEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Management compensation; Management incentives; Ownership structure; Principal agent theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033196457     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00040-2     Document Type: Article

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