The trade-off between risk and control in corporate ownership

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 160, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 252-274

  Manjón, Miguel C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142691071     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456041438849     Document Type: Article

References (47)

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