The juxtaposition of social surveillance controls with traditional organizational design components

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 605-638

  Widener, Sally K ^a   Shackell, Margaret B ^b   Demers, Elizabeth A ^c  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology

^c INSEAD ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 45849142605     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/car.25.2.11     Document Type: Review

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