The roles of performance measures and monitoring in annual governance decisions in entrepreneurial firms

Journal of Accounting Research

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 485-518

  Engel, Ellen ^a   Gordon, Elizabeth A ^b   Hayes, Rachel M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036591270     PISSN: 00218456     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.00058     Document Type: Article

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