Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 7-30

  Arya, Anil ^a   Fellingham, John ^a   Glover, Jonathan ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Implicit incentives; Mutual monitoring; Teams

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031138629     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(96)00446-6     Document Type: Article

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