Performance measure properties and delegation

Accounting Review

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 897-924

  Moers, Frank ^a,b  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contractibility; Delegation; Financial vs. nonfinancial performance measures; Performance measure properties; Simultaneity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747499880     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2006.81.4.897     Document Type: Article

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