Monitoring and incentives in sales organizations: An agency-theoretic perspective

Marketing Science

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 107-123

  Joseph, Kissan ^a   Thevaranjan, Alex ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^b SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Monitoring; Salesforce compensation; Salesforce control

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032220787     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.17.2.107     Document Type: Review

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