Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization?

Canadian Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 878-906

  Poitevin, Michel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142719019     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00046     Document Type: Article

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