Using delegation and control systems to mitigate the trade-off between the performance-evaluation and belief-revision uses of accounting signals

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 255-282

  Narayanan, V G ^a   Davila, Antonio ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief revision; Delegation; M41; Multiple control systems; Performance evaluation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040685740     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00025-1     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Antle R., Eppen G. Capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting. Management Science. 31:1985;163-174.
2. Arya A., Glover J., Sivaramakrishnan K. The interaction between decision and control problems and the value of information. Accounting Review. 72:1997;561-574.
3. Baiman S. Agency research in management accounting: A survey. Journal of Accounting Literature. 1:1982;154-213.
4. Baiman S., Demski J. Economically optimal performance evaluation and control systems. Journal of Accounting Research. 18:1980;184-220.
5. Baiman, S., Rajan, M., 1996. Optimal cost targets and incentives for skill acquisition, University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, working paper.
6. Baiman S., Verrecchia R. Earnings and price-based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 20:1995;93-121.
7. Baiman S., Verrecchia R. The relation among capital markets, financial disclosure, production efficiency, and insider trading. Journal of Accounting Research. 34:1996;1-22.
8. Bruns, W., 1994. Kendall square research corporation (A), Harvard Business School Case 9-194-068.
9. Bushman R., Indjejikian R. Accounting income, stock price and managerial compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 16:1993;3-24.
10. Dada M., Marcellus M. Process control with learning. Operations Research. 42:1994;323-336.
11. Darrough M., Stoughton N. Financial disclosure policy in an entry game. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 12:1990;219-243.
12. Evans III J., Sridhar S. Multiple control systems, accrual accounting, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research. 34:1996;45-65.
13. Feltham G., Xie J. Voluntary disclosure in an entry game with continua of types. Contemporary Accounting Research. 9:1992;46-80.
14. Fine C. Quality improvement and learning in productive systems. Management Science. 32:1986;1301-1315.
15. Fine C. A quality control model with learning effects. Operations Research. 36:1988;437-444.
16. Gjesdal F. Accounting for stewardship. Journal of Accounting Research. 19:1981;208-231.
17. Grossman S., Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica. 51:1983;7-45.
18. Grossman S., Kihlstrom R., Mirman L. A Bayesian approach to the production of information and learning by doing. The Review of Accounting Studies. 138:1977;533-547.
19. Harris M., Raviv A. The capital budgeting process: Incentives and information. Journal of Finance. 51:1996;1139-1174.
20. Holmstrom B., Milgrom P. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 7:1991;24-52.
21. Kaplan R., Norton D. The balanced scorecard: Measures that drive performance. Harvard Business Review. 70:1992;71-79.
22. Kren L., Liao W. The role of accounting information in the control of organizations: A review of the evidence. Journal of Accounting Literature. 7:1988;280-309.
23. Marcellus R., Dada M. Interactive process quality improvement. Management Science. 37:1991;1365-1376.
24. Melumad N., Mookherjee D. Delegation as commitment: The case of income tax audits. Rand Journal of Economics. 20:1989;139-163.
25. Simons, R., 1995. Levers of control: How managers use innovative control systems to drive strategic renewal. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass.