Peer pressure in an agency relationship

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 234-254

  Barron, John M ^b   Gjerde, Kathy Paulson ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031496306     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209832     Document Type: Article

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