The effects of performance separability and contract type on agent effort

Accounting, Organizations and Society

Volumn 25, Issue 7, 2000, Pages 683-695

  Rankin, Frederick W ^a   Sayre, Todd L ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034288860     PISSN: 03613682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0361-3682(99)00059-8     Document Type: Article

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