The complexity of bribery in elections

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 641-646

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^a  

^a University of Rochester   (United States)

^b Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING;

DODGSON VOTING; NONHOMOGENEOUS ELECTORATE BRIBABILITY; NONSUCCINCT INPUT SPECIFICATIONS; SCORING PROTOCOLS;

SOCIAL ASPECTS;

EID: 33750691353     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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