Issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation

Informatica (Ljubljana)

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 3-31

  Chevaleyre, Yann ^a   Dunne, Paul E ^b   Endriss, Ulle ^c   Lang, Jérôme ^d   Lemaître, Michel ^e   Maudet, Nicolas ^a   Padget, Julian ^f   Phelps, Steve ^b   Rodríguez Aguilar, Juan A ^g   Sousa, Paulo ^h  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^d IRIT   (France)

^e ONERA   (France)

^f University of Bath   (United Kingdom)

^g ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IIIA CSIC   (Spain)

^h INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE ENGENHARIA DO PORTO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Complexity; Negotiation; Preferences; Resource allocation; Simulation; Social welfare

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

MANUFACTURING CONTROL; NEGOTIATION; PREFERENCES; SOCIAL WELFARE;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 33144473688     PISSN: 03505596     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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