Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2002, Pages 314-319

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SOFTWARE AGENTS; THEOREM PROVING;

UNWEIGHTED VOTERS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 0036923193     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (10)

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2. Bartholdi, III, J. J.; Tovey, C. A.; and Trick, M. A. 1989a. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare 6(3):227-241.
3. Bartholdi, III, J. J.; Tovey, C. A.; and Trick, M. A. 1989b. Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election. Social Choice and Welfare 6:157-165.
4. Cormen, T. H.; Leiserson, C. E.; and Rivest, R. L. 1990. Introduction to Algorithms. MIT Press.
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7. Gibbard, A. 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica 41:587-602.
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9. Orponen, P.; Ko, K.-I.; Schöning, U.; and Watanabe, O. 1994. Instance complexity. J. of the ACM 41 (1):96-121.
10. Satterthwaite, M. A. 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10:187-217.