Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 613-619

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATION THEORY; HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SET THEORY; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

MULTIPLE AGENTS; SLATER PROBLEMS; SLATER RANKINGS; SLATER RULE;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 33750697928     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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