Unconditional privacy in social choice

Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on the Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 207-218

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

REPUTATION EFFECTS; SOCIAL CHOICE; SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONAL (SWF);

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION;

EID: 32144458249     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

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