Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 523-528

  Woeginger, Gerhard J ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

^b GRAZ UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037791891     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550200197     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Copeland AH (1951) A "reasonable" social welfare function. Seminar on applications of mathematics to social sciences. University of Michigan
4. Garey MR, Johnson DS (1979) Computers and intractability: A guide to the theory of NP-completeness. Freeman, San Francisco
5. Laslier J-F (1997) Tournament solutions and majority voting. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
6. Moon JW (1968) Topics on tournaments. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York
7. Moulin H (1986) Choosing from a tournament. Soc Choice Welfare 3: 272-291
8. Schwartz T (1990) Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution. Soc Choice Welfare 7: 19-29