Legislative organization and pollution taxation

Public Choice

Volumn 131, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 217-242

  Fredriksson, Per G ^a   Millimet, Daniel L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

^b SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bicameralism; Corruption; Environmental policy; Taxes; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947164427     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9114-0     Document Type: Article

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