Games played through agents

Econometrica

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 989-1026

  Prat, Andrea ^a   Rustichini, Aldo ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Balanced games; Common agency

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ECONOMICS; MARKETING; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION; LABOR MARKETS; MECHANISM DESIGN; POLITICAL ECONOMY; STRATEGIC INEFFICIENCY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0141606830     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00437     Document Type: Article

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