Bicameral legislatures and fiscal policy

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 68, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 646-659

  Bradbury, John Charles ^a   Crain, W Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036003780     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061723     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Measuring citizen and government ideology in the American States, 1960-93
2. Sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy: A dynamic analysis
3. Legislative organization and government spending: Cross-country evidence
4. Bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium
5. Cost and output in the legislative firm
6. Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures
7. The dynamics of political compromise
8. Regulation and the theory of legislative choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
9. The federalist LXII
10. The core of the constitution
11. Testing political economy's 'as if' proposition: Is the median voter really decisive?
12. On the size of US government: Political economy in the neoclassical growth model
13. Bicameralism: When are two decisions better than one?
14. Economics of direct legislation
15. A rational theory of the size of government
16. Separation of powers and political accountability
17. Institutional approaches to public expenditure: Empirical evidence from Swiss municipalities
18. Wagner's hypothesis in time-series and cross-section perspectives
19. The justification of bicameralism
20. The sizes of legislatures
21. Patterns of bicameralism
22. Problems of majority voting