Lobbying legislatures

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 110, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 919-946

  Bennedsen, Morten ^a   Feldmann, Sven E ^a  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LEGISLATION; POLITICAL SYSTEM; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 0036693787     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/340775     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Campaign contributions and access
2. Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
3. Interest groups, influence and welfare
4. Lobbying and legislative organization: The effect of the vote of confidence procedure
5. The value of biased information: A rational choice model of political advice
6. Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure
7. Buying supermajorities
8. Political economy, information, and incentives
9. Parliamentary lobby regimes
10. Information, access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying
11. An information rationale for the power of special interests
12. American business, public policy, case-studies, and political theory
13. On buying legislatures
14. Are contributions rational? Untangling strategies of political action committees
15. The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics