Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 1-16

  Aidt, Toke S ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

D78; Environmental policy; H23; Lobby groups; Positive environmental economics; Q28

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003154918     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00006-1     Document Type: Article

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