The institutional environment for economic growth

Economics and Politics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-31

  Henisz, Witold J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002322852     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00066     Document Type: Article

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