When the weak win: The role of investment in environmental lobbying

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-22

  Damania, R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLEANER PRODUCTION; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; INDUSTRIAL REGULATION; INVESTMENT;

EID: 0035705231     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2000.1147     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Lobbying incentives and the pattern of protection in rich and poor countries
2. Trade policies in developed countries
3. Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters
4. Menu actions, resource allocation and economic influence
5. Taxes and subsidies for pollution-intensive industries as trade policy
6. Why do profitable energy saving projects languish?
7. Redistributive politics and economic efficiency
8. The political economy of environmental regulations, government assistance and foreign trade
9. The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy
10. The fat cat effect, the puppy dog ploy and the lean and hungry look
11. Protection for sale
12. Rent dissipation, free riding and trade policy
13. The toxic intensity of industrial production: Global patterns, trends and trade policy
14. Incentives for advanced pollution abatement at the industry level: An evaluation of policy alternatives
15. Cleaning up while cleaning up? Pollution abatement, interest groups and contingent trade policies
16. In search of pollution havens? Dirty industries in the world economy
17. Reducing wastes can be cost effective
18. Towards a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship
19. Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly