Comparative politics and environmental taxation

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 705-722

  Fredriksson, Per G ^a   Millimet, Daniel L ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D7; Democracy; Gasoline; Government regimes; H1; Institutions; Propensity score matching; Q28; Taxation

Indexed keywords

DATA ACQUISITION; DIESEL FUELS; GASOLINE; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; PUBLIC POLICY; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION; POLLUTION TAXATION;

TAXATION;

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL TAX; PETROLEUM; POLLUTION TAX; PRICE DETERMINATION;

EID: 3042691128     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2003.10.001     Document Type: Article

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