Political instability, corruption and policy formation: The case of environmental policy

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 7-8, 2003, Pages 1383-1405

  Fredriksson, Per G ^a   Svensson, Jakob ^b  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Bribery; Environmental regulations; Lobbying; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042415363     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00036-1     Document Type: Article

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