Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game

Ecology Letters

Volumn 8, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 748-766

  Doebeli, Michael ^a   Hauert, Christoph ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Continuous games; Evolution of cooperation; Game theory; Iterated games; Populations; Spatially structured; Tragedy of the Commune

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY;

EID: 20744435030     PISSN: 1461023X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x     Document Type: Review

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