Simple adaptive strategy wins the prisoner's dilemma

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 218, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 261-272

  Hauert, Christoph ^a,b,c   Stenull, Olaf ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADAPTATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; PRISONER DILEMMA;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; ERROR; EVOLUTION; LEARNING; MEMORY; PERFORMANCE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SIMULATION;

GOES;

EID: 0036401210     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2002.3072     Document Type: Article

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