Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 270, Issue 1519, 2003, Pages 1099-1104

  Brandt, Hannelore ^a   Hauert, Christoph ^a,b   Sigmund, Karl ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Punishment; Reputation; Spatial games

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; PUBLIC GOODS; TERRITORIALITY;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; ECONOMICS; EVOLUTION; GAME; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT;

EID: 0038191147     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2003.2336     Document Type: Article

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