Replicator dynamics for optional public good games

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 218, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 187-194

  Hauert, Christoph ^a,b   De Monte, Silvia ^a,c   Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Sigmund, Karl ^a,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF DENMARK   (Denmark)

^d 11ASA ^*  (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; PUBLIC GOODS; RESOURCE ECONOMY;

ARTICLE; DYNAMICS; EXPERIMENTAL MODEL; GAME; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL CARE;

EID: 0036401286     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2002.3067     Document Type: Article

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