The logic of contrition

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 185, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 281-293

  Boerlijst, Maarten C ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a   Sigmund, Karl ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GENETIC STABILITY; LOGIC; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; POPULATION GENETICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

EID: 0031557699     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.1996.0326     Document Type: Article

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