Evolution of strategies in the three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma game

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 195, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 53-67

  Matsushima, Masanao ^a   Ikegami, Takashi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MODEL; PRISONER DILEMMA;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SIMULATION;

EID: 0032494746     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.1998.0780     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. AKIMOV, V. & SOUTCHANSKI, M. (1994). Automata simulation of N-person social dilemma games. J. Conflict Resolution 38, 138-148.
2. AXELROD, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
3. AXELROD, R. (1986). An evolutionary approch to norms. Amer. Poli. Sci. Rev. 80, 1095-1111.
4. BENDOR, J., KRAMER, R. M. & STOUT, S. (1991). When in doubt: cooperation in a noisy prisoner's dilemma. J. Conflict Resolution 35, 691-719.
5. BOYD, R. (1989). Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner' dilemma game. J. theor. Biol. 136, 47-56.
6. BOYD, R. & LORBERBAUM, J. P. (1987). No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 327, 58-59.
7. BOYD, R. & RICHERSON, P. J. (1988). The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups. J. theor. Biol. 132, 337-356.
8. DUGATKIN, L. A. (1990). N person games and the evolution of cooperation: a model based on predator inspection in fish. J. theor. Biol. 142, 123-135.
9. HAMBURGER, H. (1973). N person prisoner's dilemma. J. Math. Soc. 3, 27-48.
10. IKEGAMI, T. (1994). From genetic evolution to emergence of game strategies. Physica D 75, 310-327.
11. LINDGREN, K. (1992). Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics. In: Artificial Life II (Langton, C. G. et al., eds) pp. 295-312. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
12. LINDGREN, K. & NORDAHL, M. G. (1994). Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games. Physica D 75, 292-309.
13. LINDGREN, K. (1996). Evolutionary dynamics in game-theory models. In: The Economy as an Evolving Complex Systems II (Arthur, W. B., Durlauf, S. & Lane, D., eds). pp. 337-367. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
14. LORBERBAUM, J. (1994). No strategy is evolutionarily stable in repeated prisoner's dilemma. J. theor. Biol. 168, 117-130.
15. MILLER, J. H. (1996). The coevolution of automata in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 29, 87-112.
16. MOLANDER, P. (1985). The optimal level of generosity in a selfish, uncertain environment. J. Conflict Resolution 29, 611-618.
17. MOLANDER, P. (1992). The prevalence of free riding. J. Conflict Resolution 36, 756-771.
18. MULLER, U. (1987). Optimal retaliation for optimal cooperation. J. Conflict Resolution 31, 692.
19. NOWAK, M. & SIGMUND, K. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms Tit for Tat in the prisoner's dilemma game. Nature 364, 56-58.
20. RAPOPORT, A. (1994). Editorial comments. J. Conflict Resolution 38, 149-151.
21. RUBINSTEIN, A. (1986). Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma. J. Econ. Theory 39, 83-96.
22. VAN DAMME, E. (1987). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.