The dynamics of public goods

Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - Series B

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 575-587

  Hauert, Christoph ^a   Haiden, Nina ^b   Sigmund, Karl ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game theory; Public goods games; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942666447     PISSN: 15313492     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3934/dcdsb.2004.4.575     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (15)

1. U. Berger, BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR ROLE GAMES, International Journal of Game Theory 30 (2002), 527-538.
2. K. G. Binmore, PLAYING FAIR: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.
3. A. M. Colman, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1995.
4. R. M. Dawes, SOCIAL DILEMMAS, Ann. Rev. Psychol. 31 (1980), 169-193.
5. E. Fehr & S. Gächter, COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT IN PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS, Am. Econ. Rev. 90 (2000), 980-994.
6. E. Fehr & S. Gächter, ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT IN HUMANS, Nature 415 (2002), 137-140.
7. C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, & K. Sigmund, REPLICATOR DYNAMICS IN OPTIONAL PUBLIC GOODS GAMES, J. theor. Biol. 218 (2002), 187-194.
8. C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, & K. Sigmund, VOLUNTEERING AS RED QUEEN MECHANISM FOR COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES, Science 296 (2002), 1129-1132.
9. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, & R. McElreath, COOPERATION, RECIPROCITY AND PUNISHMENT IN FIFTEEN SMALL SCALE SOCIETIES, Am. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001), 73-78.
10. J. Hofbauer & A. Gaunersdorfer FICTITIOUS PLAY, SHAPLEY POLYGONS, AND THE REPLICATOR EQUATION, Games and Economic Behaviour 11 (1995), 279-303.
11. J. Hofbauer & K. Sigmund, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND POPULATION DYNAMICS, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
12. J. Hofbauer & K. Schlag, SOPHISTICATED IMITATION IN CYCLIC GAMES, J. Evolutionary Economics 10 (2000), 523-543.
13. J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth, eds. THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
14. M. Milinski, D. Semmann, & H.-J. Krambeck, REPUTATION HELPS SOLVE THE 'TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS', Nature 415 (2002), 424-426.
15. K. Sigmund, C. Hauert, & M. A. Nowak, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98 (2001), 10757-10762.