The efficiency of adapting aspiration levels

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 266, Issue 1427, 1999, Pages 1427-1435

  Posch, Martin ^a   Pichler, Alexander ^b   Sigmund, Karl ^b,c  

^a MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Games; Learning rules; Natural selection; Satisficing

Indexed keywords

ADAPTATION; GAME THEORY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ADAPTATION; ARTICLE; GAME; LEARNING; NATURAL SELECTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

EID: 0033595095     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.1999.0797     Document Type: Article

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