Adaptation and evolution in collective systems

Adaptation And Evolution In Collective Systems

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-357

  Namatame, Akira ^a  

^a NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85115695118     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1142/6152     Document Type: Book

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