Is altruism evolutionarily stable?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 193-209

  Bester, Helmut ^a   Güth, Werner ^b  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

A13; Altruism; C72; D64; Endogenous preferences; Evolutionary stability; Strategic complements and substitutes

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032519106     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00060-7     Document Type: Article

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