Migration and the evolution of conventions

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 397-418

  Bhaskar, V ^a   Vega Redondo, Fernando ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Evolution; Migration

Indexed keywords

EID: 4844227160     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2002.03.001     Document Type: Article

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