Coordination and local interaction: Experimental evidence

Economics Letters

Volumn 58, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 269-275

  Keser, Claudia ^a   Ehrhart, Karl Martin ^a   Berninghaus, Siegfried K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

Author keywords

C72; C92; Coordination games; Experimental economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032219361     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00289-9     Document Type: Article

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