The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 111, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-22

  Robson, Arthur J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Arms race; Bounded recall; Evolution; Incomplete information; Machiavellian intelligence; Rationality; Red Queen; Repeated game

Indexed keywords

EID: 21544432194     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00084-X     Document Type: Article

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