Conjoining meanings: Semantics without truth values

Conjoining Meanings: Semantics Without Truth Values

Volumn , Issue , 2018, Pages 1-393

  Pietroski, Paul M ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Composition; Concepts; Eanings; Language; Lexicalization; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940524524     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198812722.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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